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DURING  THE  DECADE  PRIOR  TO 1968,  most  of the industrial  countries  of 
the West  experienced  a period  of tranquility  in which  prices  were  relatively 
stable and wage inflation  moderate.  Then quite suddenly-and, to judge 
from professional  and political  reaction,  unexpectedly-wages  and prices 
began  to rise  very  sharply.  Figure  1  shows  the pattern  of inflation  for  manu- 
facturing  wages  from  1956  to 1971;  the break  in the trend  in 1968  and the 
ascent  to the peak  in 1970  are  clearly  discernible.  The wage  histories  of the 
seven countries  to be considered  in this paper  are shown in Table 1.1 In 
each, wage  inflation  during  the last four or five  years  rose noticeably  over 
earlier  years  in the sixties. 
The  wage  explosion  has  tested  the ingenuity  of economists,  and  they  have 
not been found wanting.  Countless  discontinuous  time series  and special 
forces  have been discovered  to explain  this surprising  movement.  But the 
diagnoses  have  a suspicious  character.  It is as if the doctors  in a town hit by 
a plague  all cite special  factors  to account  for it: a cold, pneumonia,  the 
population  explosion,  barometric  pressure,  in-laws'  interference,  psychoso- 
matic disturbances,  and so forth and so on. Isn't it curious  that all the 
special  factors  hit all the countries  at the same  time? 
1. The seven  countries  chosen for this study  were Canada, France,  Federal  Republic 
of Germany  (referred  to hereafter  as West Germany),  Japan,  Sweden,  the United King- 
dom, and the United States.  The criteria  of choice were  that each country  should  (a) not 
be completely  dominated  by another  country  or by foreign  trade,  (b) have wages deter- 
mined more or less in an industrial market framework,  and (c) be at least slightly 
familiar  to the author. 
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Table 1. Inflation  in Manufacturing  Wages in Seven Countries, 1956-71 
Percentage change  per yeara 
West  Uniited  Utiited 
Year  Canada(la  France  Germanly  Japanl  Sweden  Kin,gdom  States 
1956  4.7  6.8  9.3  9.1  8.1  7.1  4.7 
1957  5.7  7.5  9.5  2.7  6.0  6.6  5.0 
1958  3.0  11.5  6.4  2.1  4.3  3.0  2.8 
1959  3.5  5.8  5.6  8.0  4.1  3.9  3.7 
1960  3.4  6.9  10.4  8.2  6.5  9.2  3.1 
1961  2.7  7.3  10.1  9.2  8.4  5.9  2.6 
1962  2.6  8.1  10.7  9.6  6.7  4.0  2.9 
1963  3.6  8.2  6.8  10.0  8.3  4.3  2.8 
1964  3.5  6.9  7.7  9.2  5.8  7.2  2.8 
1965  4.8  5.4  9.6  8.6  10.7  6.6  3.1 
1966  5.9  5.8  7.0  11.5  7.3  5.9  4.1 
1967  6.4  5.8  3.9  11.8  9.0  3.2  3.9 
1968  7.2  11.7  4.0  14.4  6.2  8.1  6.1 
1969  7.8  10.5  9.7  15.9  7.7  7.6  5.8 
1970  7.5  10.1  11.2  14.4  12.3  11.9  5.1 
1971  8.5  10.5  11.1  12.6  7.4  10.7  6.0 
Sources:  Econiomttic  Report  of  the President  Together  with  the  Annual  Report  of  the  Council  of  Economic 
Advisers,  January  1972;  United  Nations,  Statistical  Yearbook,  various  issues;  Organisation  for Economic-Co- 
operation and Development,  Moitm Economic Indicators: Historical Staitistics,  1959-1969 (Paris: OECD, 
1970),  and  Maini Econtotnic  Indicators,  various issues; and Departmenit  of  Emnploymnett  'Gazette  (London: 
Her Majesty's Stationery Office), various issues. 
a.  The wage inflation percentages  in this table and elsewhere in the paper  are expressed  as first differences 
in the logarithmiis  of hourly earnings of production workers (for Japan, all workers) in manufacturing.  This 
logairithmic  concept gives results that differ slightly from those obtained by the usual procedure of com- 
puting percentage  changes. 
The following is a sample of the explanations that have been put forth. In 
the first five groups are the theories that will be tested explicitly:2 
1. Monetarist. Monetarists have argued that the recent inflation is but 
another incident in a long historic series induced by excessive growth of the 
money supply. A cosmic interpretation provided by Mundell is that the 
growing deficits in the U.S. balance of payments in the late 1960s provided 
the reserves for excessive growth in the world's money supply that in turn 
led to the inflation. 
2.  Naive Phillips curve. A second simple explanation is that tight labor 
markets, measured by low unemployment rates, gave rise to unusually high 
wage inflation in the late sixties. 
3.  Expeciationis  Phillips curve. Perhaps the most  popular explanation, 
especially in the United States and Britain, is that provided by the expecta- 
2. Citations  for theories I to 5 are contained  in the relevant  sections below. 43a  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
tions Phillips curve. This theory holds that "anticipated"  inflation as well as 
tight labor markets produced the wage explosion. 
4.  Fruistration  theories. Turner and others have argued that the frustra- 
tion arising from unusually low gains in real net wages have driven labor 
unions to increase their money wage demands, especially in Britain follow- 
ing the 1967 devaluation. 
5.  Export-constraint inflation. Several  Scandinavian economists  have 
put forth a theory (not directly related to the wage explosion) that argues 
for the importance of foreign trade prices as determinants  of domestic wage 
and price movements. 
Other factors, even less general, are sometimes held responsible for the 
recent wage explosion: 
6.  Thresholdfactors. Eckstein and Brinner  have argued that when infla- 
tion reached a certain level, threshold factors changed the responsiveness of 
wage demands to past inflation. The same argument has been used by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with 
respect to threshold effects and nonlinearities of response to tightness in 
labor market conditions in Germany.3 
7.  Social or labor union militance. Many analysts have joined the U.S. 
Council of Economic Advisers in seeing the wage explosion as partly the re- 
flection of militance in social relations. They cite "trade union pushfulness" 
in the British  wage  inflation,  the increasing  militancy  of labor  in Japan,  the 
French  revolution  of 1968,  and "sociological  and political  factors"  in the 
recent  German  wage  inflation.4 
8.  Demographic  factors.  Changing demographic patterns have been the 
focus of analysis for several authors. Perry argues that a weighted unem- 
ployment  rate  is a more  appropriate  index,  while  R. J. Gordon  and others 
3. See Otto Eckstein  and Roger Brinner,  The Inflationi  Process in the UJnited  States, 
prepared  for the use of the Joint Economic  Committee,  92 Cong. 2 sess. (1972); OECD, 
OECD Econiomic  Surveys:  Germany  (Paris: OECD, June 1971), esp. Annex 1, "Wages 
and Prices  in Germany:  An Econometric  Study," pp. 45-53. 
4. See Economic  Report of the President Together  with the Annuial  Report of the 
Counicil  of Econonmic  Advisers,  February  1971,  p. 61; A. G. Hines, "The Determinants  of 
the Rate of Change  of Money Wage Rates and the Effectiveness  of Incomes  Policy,"  in 
H. G. Johnson and A. R. Nobay (eds.), The Current  Infl(ationz  (London: Macmillan, 
1971),  and earlier  references  cited there;  OECD, Inflation:  The  Presenit  Problem,  Report 
by the Secretary  General,  December  1970; OECD Economic  Surveys:  France  (Febraury 
1972  and March 1970);  Japan  (June 1971),  Annex, "Notes on the Labour Market  and 
Wage  Determination  in Japan";  and Germaniy  (1971) (the quotation  appears  on p. 9 of 
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have suggested quite the opposite, a disguised unemployment index. Perry, 
Brechling, and Lipsey have pointed to increased labor force dispersion as 
an important structural shift.5 
9.  Increased reservation  price of labor. U.S. and British observers have 
suggested that workers have had an increasing reservation price for work, 
due either to psychological changes or to changes in unemployment com- 
pensation and other benefits. The effect was to shift out the Phillips curve 
and to  stimulate greater wage inflation than would otherwise have been 
expected.6 
10. Devaluation. British economists  are virtually unanimous in  citing 
the  British devaluation of  1967 as at least  partially responsible for  the 
British wage explosion.7 
While some of these special factors may prove to be significant, it is hard 
to accept such a collection of often ad hoc and for the most part local ex- 
planations as the reason for the pervasive inflation. The unmistakable  trend 
revealed in Figure 1 makes the probability that the special factors all oc- 
curred at once too remote. But is there any unifying explanation? 
Before examining the  competing  hypotheses,  we  want to  clarify the 
methodological approach used here. The oversimplified theories presented 
below do not pretend to give the definitive view of money wage movements 
in each of the countries involved. Nor is the implication made that a careful 
analysis of the data or of special factors would not alter the results slightly 
for theory x or country y, or that the richness of the institutional detail of 
individual labor markets is adequately discussed. 
5. George L. Perry,  "Changing  Labor Markets  and Inflation,"  Brookinigs Papers  on 
Economic  Activity  (3 :1970),  pp. 411-41; Robert  J. Gordon, "Inflation  in Recession  and 
Recovery,"  Brookinlgs  Papers oni  Econiomic Activity (1:1971),  pp.  105-58;  Frank Brech- 
ling, "Wage Inflation  and the Structure  of Regional Unemployment,"  forthcoming  in 
Journlal  of Moniey, Credlit  anli Banikinlg;  and Richard G.  Lipsey, "The Relation  between 
Unemployment  and the Rate of Change  of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 
1862-1957,  A Further  Analysis,"  Economica,  n.s., Vol. 27 (February  1960),  pp. 1-31. 
6. See the discussions  by Gottfried Haberler,  Michael  Parkin,  and Henry Smith, in 
Inflaitioni  anid the  Uniionis:  Tlhree Stuidies in  the  Effects  of  Labouir Moniopoly Power  on 
htiflationt  in Britaini an1sd  the USA (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1972); and 
"Comments,"  by  Charles  Schultze,  Brookinigs Papers  oni Econiomic Activity  (3 :1970), 
pp. 442-44. 
7. See H. A. Turner  and Frank  Wilkinson,  "Real Net Incomes  and the Wage Explo- 
sion," New Society (February  25, 1971),  pp. 309-10; James E. Meade, Wages  atnd  Prices 
itn  a Mixed Econiomy (London: Institute  of Economic  Affairs, 1971); Frank W. Paish, 
How the Econiomy Works, anid  Other Essays (London:  Macmillan,  1970), Chap. 8, "Rise 
and Fall of Incomes Policy," pp. 179-231; and the discussion  of the Meade  and Paish 
theories  by Haberler in InJfla  tioni  anid  the Uniionis. 436  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
Rather, we are testing whether there is any simple explanation of  the 
pervasive pattern of wage acceleration that all the countries have experi- 
enced. If, for example, the excess demand view is the correct one, a rela- 
tively straightforward  explanation using a simple unemployment variable 
should turn up some relationship. On the other hand, if the excess demand 
theories explain little in the simplest formulation, a certain amount of 
healthy skepticism can properly be applied to further results that show ex- 
cess demand to be of great significance. 
In short, while the methods are very crude, they should cast considerable 
light on the relative merits of general theories about the wage explosion. It 
is  primarily in the spirit of  interpreting recent history that  the  present 
results are put forth. 
A Monetarist Wage Equation 
According to Milton Friedman, "Inflation is always and everywhere a 
monetary phenomenon, resulting from and accompanied by a rise in the 
quantity of  money relative to  output."8 If this position is correct anld  if 
changes in the stock of money are exogenous, the recent wage explosion 
should be explicable on monetarist grounds. 
Although no one has, to  my knowledge, attempted to  use monetarist 
principles to explain money wage movements, the notion is implicit in the 
quantity theory framework.  The simplest explanation relies on two general 
principles:9  First, the transactions velocity of money is stable, so that prices 
are proportional to  the ratio of  nominal money supply to  real output. 
8.  Milton Friedman,  "What Price  Guideposts?"  in George P. Shultz and Robert  Z. 
Aliber, Guidelines,  IJObrn7al  Contr'0ols, anid the  Mcarket Place  (University of Chicago 
Press, 1966),  p. 18. Mundell  writes:  "A plausible  case can be made  for a monetary  cause 
of the current  upward  movement  of world  prices.  From 1959  to 1964  the rate  of inflation 
and the rate  of world  money  expansion  was very  gentle.  But  from 1965  to 1971  the rate of 
monetary  growth  and the rate  of increase  in the price  level accelerated  all over the world. 
The result  was the current  inflation  rates  in excess  of 5 percent.  The simplest  theory,  that 
the monetary  acceleration  inspired  the acceleration  of prices, conforms to the facts." 
Robert Mundell, "World Inflation and the Eurodollar,"  forthcoming  in Journial of 
Moniey, Credit anid  Bainkintg. 
9. Several people have pointed out that the assumptions  hiere  do not correspond 
exactly to all the views of all the monetarists.  Subject  to some of the caveats on lags, 
however, the model here does appear to contain the essence of the strict monetarist 
position. It should be made clear that the recent and more general  work of the mone- 
tarists-especially that which is indistinguishable  from modern  "Keynesian"  theories- 
cannot be tested adequately  in the simple model used here. William D. Nordliaus  437 
Second, all real miagnitudes  are determined by competitive and other mar- 
ket forces; further, since the real wage is a smooth trend, it can be ade- 
quately represented by the assumption of constant growth in (real) mar- 
ginal productivity. 
When these two assumptions are combined, the result, first, is 
(1)  p =  FM/X, 
where 
p = the price level 
t  = the (constant) velocity of money 
M = the money supply 
X =  real output. 
Second, the real wage is given by 
W 
(2)  --  exp [a' +  a't], 
p 
where w is hourly earnings per worker in manufacturing  industries and t is 
time. 
Substituting (1) into (2) and taking logarithms results in the monetarist 
wage equation, 
(3)  ln w1 = ao +  alt +  a, ln M, +  a,s  ln X,. 
Note that the constant velocity term is now subsumed in ao. Two versions 
of this theory are used here. In the "constrained" version (1) and (2) are 
taken literally, and a2 =  -a3  =  1. In the "unconstrained"  version, a2  and 
a3 are allowed to find their own values. 
Because of the customary six-month lag between monetary impulse and 
the change in income, the money supply is lagged by one-half year in the 
equations to follow. The basic results for the monetarist wage equations are 
shown in Table 2. For the seven countries examined, it gives the coefficients 
and summary statistics for the unconstrained equations; and, for compari- 
son, it gives the summary statistics for the equation in which the coefficients 
are constrained to fit the strict monetarist hypothesis.10 
10. Several objections have been made against the lag structure  used in Table 2, 
especiallyagainst  the short lag allowed  for velocity  to return  to its proper  level.  Given the 
approach  used  here  (see especially  pp. 435-36 above),  it would be inappropriate  to search 
for the best-fitting  lag structure  for each variable  or each country. Nevertheless,  to see 
whether  a longer  lag would  change  the results  significantly,  one further  equation  was run, 
with a three-year  distributed  lag. The only significant  change  was an improvement  in the 
standard  error  for Japan, but the signs continued  to be incorrect. u  u)  0 
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We can summarize  the results by noting whether, on the basis of estimates 
from the unconstrained equation, we can reject the strict monetarist hy- 
pothesis that a2 =  -a:3  =  1. In general (1) the monetarist hypothesis is 
acceptable if a coefficient is significantly different from zero but not from 
one; (2) the evidence is insufficient  if a coefficient is not significantly  different 
from either zero or one; and (3) the hypothesis is rejected  if a coefficient is 
significantly different from one.11 The results are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Tests of Monetarist Hypothesis, a2  =-  a3  =1,  Seven 
Countries  and Two Coefficients 
Accept  Iislfficietit  Reject 
Cotoitry or coefficient  hypothesis  evidence  hypothesis 
Colnttry 
Canada  0  1  1 
France  0  1  I 
West Germany  0  1  1 
Japan  0  0  2 
Sweden  0  0  2 
United Kinigdom  0  1  1 
United States  0  0  2 
Total  0  4  10 
ItCliVidiial  coef  cient 
a2 (In M-I)  0  0  7 
3 (ln Xt)  0  4  3 
Total  0  4  10 
Source: Table 2. For criteria of acceptance and rejection, see text. 
Plainly, the strict monetarist hypothesis is rejected  whenever  the evidence 
is sufficient. In no country is the hypothesis accepted for either coefficient; 
in ten cases it is rejected. Even the weak hypothesis that the coefficient on 
the money supply should be positive is unsatisfactory. The coefficients on 
the crucial monetary variables are significant in two cases: for the United 
States (with the right sign) and for France (with the wrong sign). 
The theory outlined here is perhaps too literal a rendition of the mone- 
tarist viewpoint. Some of the complications are noted by Friedman: 
This phenomenon  of prices  changing  by more than the difference  between  the 
change  in output  and  the change  in money  stock  is often  observed....  How much 
velocity  will change  depends  on whether  the fall in prices  or the rise in prices  is 
11. The philosophy underlying  these definitions is that the monetarist  hypothesis 
must do signiificantly  better  than the naive hypothesis  of a zero coefficient.  The criterion 
is quite close to a likelihood ratio test of the alternatives  of zero and unity. 440  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
anticipated.  Generally,  when  inflation  has stLrted  after  a period  of roughly  stable 
prices,  people initially  do not expect prices  to continue  rising.  They regard  the 
price  rise as temporary  and expect prices  to fall later on. In consequence,  they 
tend to increase  their monetary  holdings  and the price  rise is less than the rise in 
the stock of money.  Then, as people  gradually  become  wise to what is going on, 
they tend to readjust  their holdings.  Prices  then rise more  than in proportion  to 
the stock of money.  Eventually  people  come to expect  roughly  what is happening 
and prices  rise in proportion  to the stock of money.12 
In other words, the simple relationship may be complicated by a fall in 
velocity at the beginning of a monetary expansion, followed by a rise. 
One possible reason for the divergence of the coefficients from the unity 
predicted by the monetarist hypothesis is the movement in velocity noted 
by Friedman. The idea is that only part of a rise in the money supply is 
immediately realized in inflation. The rest is realized only with a lag. This 
might imply, for example, that the proper form is 
n  Mr 
(4)  In p  =  aO 
+ 
La,iIn  M,-i  +  a2  In  Xt_,. 
Assuming A ln M, and A ln X, are not autocorrelated, the procedure used 
above will estimate only a,,  and a21, while the monetarist hypothesis is that 
n  ttl 
Ea,,=-  a2i=1 
If  it seems reasonable to  assume that  the lag shapes are similar for 
countries, the estimated coefficients should be similar. According to Table 
2, however, there is no uniformity of size or sign in the coefficients. 
This lack of uniformity is perhaps what Friedman has in mind when he 
writes: 
...  while inflation  or, in the contrary  case, deflation,  is produced  by changes  in 
the stock of money  per unit of output,  the relationship  is not mechanically  pre- 
cise. It is not always  the same  under  all circumstances  and it cannot  be predicted 
with precise  accuracy.'3 
The  same caveats can  be  applied to  Marxian value theory,  Ptolemaic 
astronomy, and Lysenkian genetics. 
To what extent can we accept a monetarist interpretation  that the recent 
world inflation is due to an abnormally  large rise in the world money supply? 
We have seen that the wage explosion can be dated from 1968. Table 4 
12.  Milton  Friedman,  Dollars  atid Deficits:  Livintg wit/i America's  Econtomic Prob- 
lems (Prentice-Hall,  1968), p. 24. 
13.  Ibid., p. 25. William D. Nordl/aus  441 
Table 4.  Prediction Errors  in Unconstrained  Monetarist Wage Equation, 
Seven Countries, 1968-71 
Percent per yeara 
Coulntry  1968  1969  1970  1971  Average 
Canada  1.8  2.5  2.5  3.4  2.6 
France  3.0  1.4  0.2  2.1  1.7 
West  Germany  -5.3  0.3  3.7  2.6  0.3 
Japan  -3.3  1.5  5.0  13.0  4.1 
Sweden  -0.3  1.2  4.1  -0.3  1.2 
United Kingdom  0.9  -0.9  -0.  1  0.8  0.2 
United  States  0.5  1.0  5.8  4.0  2.8 
Average  -0.4  1.0  3.0  3.7  1.8 
Source: See Table 2. 
a.  Table shows actual tninus  predicted changes in wages where predicted values are from the uncon- 
strained equation in Table 2. 
gives the patterns of residuals-prediction  errors-in  the seven countries 
for the four observations since then.14 With the exception of the United 
Kingdom and Germany, all countries (and the average) showed significant 
residual wage inflation during the period of the explosion. 
In summary, the monetarist explanation of the wage explosion is defec- 
tive. In the first place, the equations do not perform well over the sample 
period. In the second, they seriously underpredict  wage movements during 
1968-71  15 
Naive Phillips Curve 
One of the most popular orthodox explanations of wage behavior is the 
so-called "naive" Phillips curve. This explanation simply relates the rate of 
increase  of money wage rates or earnings to some measure of labor market 
tightness, usually the unemployment rate. 
The usual form is 
(5)  ln w, = bo + b, 
where u is the unemployment rate. 
14. Using the "unconstrained"  version evaluates the theory generously.  The con- 
strained  version  performs  far worse. 
15. The above estimates are probably  charitable specifications  for the monetarist 
point of view because  of the endogenous nature  of the money supply. It is instructive 
to note that the regressions  shown in Table 2 do best for the United States-where 
monetary  policy is relatively  active-and  do most poorly for Sweden, Germany,  and 
France-where monetary  policy is either  absent or dictated  by external  conditions. 442  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  2:1972 
The rationale behind the naive Phillips curve usually runs as follows: 16  In 
a given labor market, wages tend to rise under conditions of excess demand, 
fall with excess supply, and remain constant when excess demands are zero. 
Since the aggregate unemployment rate is a good indicator of the general 
state of labor markets, as unemployment decreases, more and more markets 
come into a state of excess demand and the general pace of wage inflation 
increases. Because of the frictions in labor markets, however, rising wages, 
rather than stable wages, would be expected when excess demand for labor 
is zero (that is, when vacancies equal aggregate unemployment). 
The Phillips curves discussed here use the civilian unemployment rate as 
the measure of labor market tightness. More sophisticated measures (such 
as vacancies or the weighted unemployment rate) might be preferable, but 
the  criterion of  data  uniformity and  time  limitations  ruled out  other 
variables. 
Table 5 gives the regressions of the naive Phillips curves for the countries 
Table 5.  Naive Phillips Curves, Regression Results, Seven Countriesa 
Coefficietit  Stantcdaird  Duirbini- 
error of  Waitsonl 
Counitry  bo  b0  estimate  statistic 
Canada  0.0116  1.97  0.0185  0.22 
(1.10) 
France  0.1015  -0.27  0.0216  1.54 
(0.29) 
West Germany  0.0693  0.16  0.0245  1.07 
(0.13) 
Japan  0.0524  0.51  0.0375  0.58 
(0.47) 
Sweden  0.0383  0.57  0.0201  1.87 
(0.35) 
United  Kingdom  0.0941  -0.46  0.0255  1.43 
(0.38) 
United  States  -0.0044  2.14  0.0092  1.07 
(0.58) 
Source: See Table 2. 
a.  A In we = bo +  bil/ut, where w =  hourly earnings per worker in manufacturing industries and u  = 
civilian uniemiiploymiient  rate. 
16. See, for example, Lipsey, "Relation between Unemployment  and the Rate of 
Change  of Money Wage Rates." William D. Nordhaus  443 
Table 6.  Prediction Errors for Naive Phillips Curve Regressions, Seven 
Countries, 1968-71 
Percent  per year 
Coco1try  1968  1969  1970  1971  A verage 
Canada  1.6  2.5  2.7  4.2  2.8 
France  3.0  1.8  1.6  1.8  2.1 
West Germany  -3.8  1.4  3.0  2.0  0.7 
Japan  4.9  6.2  4.7  3.1  4.7 
Sweden  -0.6  0.9  5.0  0.3  1.4 
United Kingdom  0.8  0.2  4.5  2.5  2.0 
United States  0.7  0.1  0.5  2.2  0.9 
Average  0.9  1.9  3.1  2.3  2.1 
Source: Equationi  used for Table 5. 
studied, and Table 6 lists the residuals during the period of the wage ex- 
plosion. Clearly, the naive Phillips curves do not perform adequately. Ex- 
cept for the United States and Canada, the unemployment rate is not an im- 
portant variable explaining wage changes, and for France and the United 
Kingdom, it has the wrong sign. Nor does it explain the wage explosion, as 
shown by the substantial errors in Table 6, although for the United States, 
it does fairly well until 1971, and much better than the monetarist equa- 
tions. The wage explosion of 1968-71 cannot be explained simply by excess 
demand and tight labor markets. 
Expectations Phillips Curves 
For obvious reasons most econometricians have preferred  the more so- 
phisticated versions of the Phillips curve. Almost all of them have included 
current or lagged price change, along with profit rates, vacancy rates, tax 
rates, lagged  wages,  wage  dispersion,  unemployment dispersion, trade 
union  membership, change  in  money  supply,  and  no  end  of  dummy 
variables. 
The most carefully studied version, sometimes called the expectations 
hypothesis, includes a proxy measure of the expected rate of inflation. The 
basic idea is that wages result from a bargaining process rather than decen- 
tralized market mechanisms, and that both sides bargain for increases in 
real rather than money wages. In the strict accelerationist form, a rise in 
fully anticipated inflation, other things equal, produces an equal rise in wage 444  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
rate increases; in this form, the wage equation is in the long run a real wage 
equation. The expectations Phillips curve usually takes the following form: 






TyEXz=  1, 
i=l 
-rt  is the rate of inflation (A ln pt),  and Xi is the weight given to successive 
past rates of inflation (see the appendix for the exact construction). 
The only difficulty for estimation is choosing the coefficients on past in- 
flation, X. We have arbitrarily chosen X =  0.8, and truncated after seven 
years. The lag structure is of particular  importance for two reasons: First, 
the short lags used in earlier  studiesl7-in  the extreme, one quarter-are  ex- 
tremely implausible as a measure of the best distributed  lag for the expected 
rate of inflation. Moreover, the only serious evidence on the question of ex- 
pectations, an examination of the behavior of interest rates during infla- 
tionary periods, shows lags much longer than one quarter.lS 
Second, serious bias can arise from including a price term on the right- 
hand side of a wage equation, especially for the United States. Given the 
autocorrelated nature of disturbances in most wage equations and the fact 
that prices tend to be a simple markup on wages, any disturbance in the 
wage equation will be reflected fairly quickly in the price term. The shorter 
the lag and the greater the autocorrelation of disturbance, the greater the 
bias.  19 
17. Thus the following mean lags are found in U.S. Phillips  curve studies: 
Author  MeanI  lag (yeairs) 
Eckstein and Brinner, Iniflationi  Process  0.5 
Perry,  "Changing  Labor Markets"  0.25 
R. J. Gordon, "Inflation  in Recession  and Recovery"  0.25 to 1. 1 
Present  study  3.15 
18. See the discussion in F. Thomas Juster and Paul Wachtel, "Inflation  and the 
Consumer,"  Brookitigs Papers  otn Econiomic Activity  (1:1972),  pp.  71-144;  and  the 
various  papers in The Econiomics of Secular  Itnfltioni, forthcoming  issue of the Journial 
of Money, Credit  atnd  Banikinig.  I am also indebted  to my colleague, William  Brainard, 
for pointing out additional pitfalls in the interest rate approachi  to determining  the 
expected  rate of inflation. 
19. As a simple example, assume that money wage inflation  is a  Markov process, William D. Nordlhaus  445 
Since the estimated autocorrelation of the disturbances in naive Phillips 
curves tends to  be around one-half (for annual estimates), and since, in 
constructed inflation variables, lags tend to range between one quarter  and 
one year, the universal  finding of an expectations coefficient of around one- 
half is very suspicious. On the other hand, our constructed estimate is 
probably reasonably free of estimation bias.20 
The results for the expectations Phillips curve are shown in Tables 7 and 
8. At first blush these are more acceptable than those for the naive Phillips 
curves (compare them with Tables 5 and 6). This hypothesis performs par- 
ticularly well for the United States, and reasonably well for Canada, Japan, 
and Sweden, a  pattern of  results that  is  quite plausible on  theoretical 
grounds. On the other hand, the estimates are unacceptable for France and 
Germany.2' 
One of the interesting aspects of the results is the coefficient on price ex- 
pectations, b2. In a test (with the standard t-test and the estimates of the b2 
coefficients in Table 7) for the possibility that b2 =  1, the accelerationist 
hypothesis is not rejected  for four countries (Japan, Sweden, United King- 
domi, United States) and is rejected for three (Canada, France, and West 
Germany) (see Table 8). 
During the period 1968-71, the seven economies exhibit considerable un- 
explained wage movement even after the sophisticated Phillips curve is 
taken into account (see Table 9). Even so, this explanation seems to suffice 
for the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada. 
that the autocorrelation  in the wage equLation  is p, and that wage increases  are immedi- 
ately passed througlh  inito  prices. If an expected price variable  is constructed  as price 
iniflation  lagged 6 years, the expected coefficient  on the price term will be pa.  Thus if 
p = 0.5 at an annual rate, the bias is as follows: 
Estitnaited  bias (coefficient oti 
A veralge  lag (years)  expected inflationi) 
0  1.00 
0.25  0.84 
1.00  0.50 
4.00  0.06 
20. For a furtlher  discussioit  of this question,  see p. 447. 
21. The pattern  of results  is unacceptable  for France  and Germany  if one accepts  tlle 
hypotlhesis  that the variable  ire is indeed the expected  rate of inflation.  On a different 
interpretation,  William  Fellner  has pointed  out that a negative  sign is, in principle,  ac- 
ceptable: People might feel that past inflation,  as measured  by 7r',  would be followed 
by deflation. 446  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2.1972 
Table 7.  Expectations Phillips Curve Regression Results, Seven 
Countriesa 
Coefficient  Stanidard  Duirbini- 
error of  Watson 
Countitry  bo  b,  b2  estimate  statistic 
Canada  -0.0323  1.629  2.477  0.0075  2.64 
(0.400)  (0.270) 
France  0.1507  -0.144  -1.360  0.0193  1.25 
(0.228)  (0.651) 
West  Germany  0.0706  0.481  -1  .858  0.0174  0.88 
(0.116)  (0.550) 
Japan  0.0197  0.317  1.259  0.0333  0.77 
(0.406)  (0.623) 
Sweden  -0.0485  0.997  1.588  0.0203  1.99 
(0.627)  (1.905) 
United Kingdom  0.0543  -0.151  0.608  0.0270  1.46 
(0.389)  (0.890) 
United States  -0.0172  1.962  0.873  0.0062  2.36 
(0.391)  (0.204) 
Source: See the appendix for explanation of the symnbols  and sources of the basic data, which are annuLal 
observations covering the 1955-71 period. The numiibers  in parenitheses  are standard errors. 
a.  Equation 6: A In wt =  bo +  bhi/ut +  b27rt,  where T-e  A In pt,  and  7  0.253  -iei  +  7  0.202 7rt-2  + 
0.162 7rt-3  +  0.130 7rt-4  +  0.103 7ri-.5  +  0.083 7rt-6  +  0.067 7rt-7,  where u  =  civilian unemiiploymiient  rate and 
p is the inflation rate. 




Chlaralcteristic  of coefficienit  bi  b2 
Correct  sign 
Significant  3  3 
Within  a priori  rangea  0  2 
Insignificant  2  2 
Incorrect  sign 
Significant  0  2 
Insignificant  2  0 
Source: See Table 7. 
a.  This refers to the specification that 0  <  b2  _  1 and tests whether the estimnated  value of b2 lies within 
two stanidard  deviations of this range. William D. Nordhaus  447 
Table 9.  Prediction Errors for Expectations Phillips Curve Regressions, 
Seven Countries, 1968-71 
Percent  per year 
Coitutry  1968  1969  1970  1971  Average 
Canada  0.7  0.1  -0.6  0.5  0.2 
France  1.6  1.1  1.5  2.1  1.6 
West Germany  -1.2  1.2  2.7  3.1  1.5 
Japan  3.4  4.9  3.2  1.1  3.2 
Sweden  -0.8  1.0  4.9  0.4  1.4 
United Kingdom  1.3  0.6  4.7  2.9  2.4 
Uiiited States  0.8  -0.2  -0.7  0.6  0.1 
Average  0.8  1.2  2.2  1.5  1.5 
Source: Se  Table 7. 
Because the imposed lag is so much shorter than is customary, it ap- 
peared useful to test whether a shorter lag would change any of the con- 
clusions of the present paper. Four more ordinary least squares regressions 
were run with linear declining lags on past price inflation of one, two, three, 
and four years. The following table shows the standard  error of estimate for 
the various equations: 
Maxi- 
nmum  West  United 
Icg  Ger-  King-  United 
(years)  Canada  France  many  Japan  Sweden  dom  States 
1  0.01324  0.02213  0.02302  0.03273  0.02076  0.02717  0.00755 
2  0.01168  0.02204  0.02077  0.02908  0.02066  0.02704  0.00716 
3  0.01042  0.02194  0.01790  0.02875  0.02070  0.02675  0.00702 
4  0.00998  0.02166  0.01627  0.03047  0.02082  0.02607  0.00693 
7  0.00750  0.01934  0.01736  0.03326  0.02029  0.02704  0.00618 
The countries for which the lag imposed in the Table 7 results seems too 
long are West Germany and Japan. When the best-fitting new estimate is 
substituted, the negative coefficient on the  xe term is magnified for Ger- 
many, becoming -3.1  in the best equation, and the residuals are very little 
changed. For Japan, the unemployment variables develop a negative (and 
therefore unacceptable) sign. Thus (even ignoring possible bias) the im- 
posed lag does not appear to have discriminated unfairly against the ex- 
pectations Phillips curve. 448  Brookings Papers on Econontic Activity, 2.1972 
Frustration  Theories 
A rather different explanation of the wage explosion in Britain has been 
advanced by Turner and Wilkinson and supported by Paish and Meade.22 
This theory holds that the cause of the wage explosion in the United King- 
dom was the slowdown in the growth in real net earnings. As Turner and 
Wilkinson argue: 
The 1970 wage explosion  may well represent,  therefore,  one of frustrated-but 
perhaps  not altogether  unjustified-expectations.  Immediately  after  the 1967  de- 
valuation,  the near-freezing  of real consumption  could be reasonably  argued  as 
necessary  to release  resources  for exports. However,  the more recent  effect of 
automatically  rising  state deductions  from  wages  has been  to produce  enormous 
national  budget  surpluses  and increased  unemployment. 
The impact of price increases  and state deductions,  together,  on real wages is 
now such that most workers  clearly  have to run as hard as they can, in wage 
terms,  merely  to stay where  they are in real  or relative  ones.23  .  .  . But  the move- 
ment  of post-tax  real  wages  ...  would  in fact appear  to provide  a major  explana- 
tion of the continuing  British  wage explosion.24 
Although the quantitative argument in this article is couched in terms of 
earnings, several reasons make it more convenient to proceed in terms of 
real consumption.25 
The frustration hypothesis has never been seriously tested, so what fol- 
lows may not do it full justice. The essence of the position is embodied in 
some combination of the specifications that follow. The first and simplest 
specification, which might be called a "frustration" Phillips curve, simply 
adds the rate of growth of consumption to the expectations Phillips curve 
used above. Thus, 
(7)  zAIlnwt=b  +b  1 +b,r+b  c 
Ut 
22. See Turner and Wilkinson, "Real Net  Incomes and the Wage Explosion"; 
Meade, Wages  anid Prices  in  a  Mixed  Economy;  Paish, "Rise and Fall of  Incomes 
Policy." 
23. "Real Net Incomes  and the Wage  Explosion,"  p. 310. 
24. Ibid., p. 309. 
25. The most important  reason is the great difficulty  in constructing  an accurate 
series  on real net wages.  To do so requires  working  out the average  direct  and indirect 
taxes paid,  as well as careful  matching  of the price  index  to eliminate  double  counting  of 
taxes. Second, to the extent that consumption  follows a permanent  income or life cycle 
model, actual consumption  will be an accurate  barometer  of expected income (or ex- 
pected sustainable  consumption).  The main disadvantage  of using consumption  is that 
if population  growth  changes  rapidly,  it may be an inaccurate  index  of per  capita  growth 
in consumption. Willianm  D. Nordliaus  449 
where 
ct =A  In C, 
Ct  aggregate consumption expenditures in constant prices. 
The a priori sign on b;.  is negative. 
The second specification takes the approach of  adaptive expectations. 
The formation of expectations about Ce is assumed to be adaptive at rate -y: 
co 





Ce  =  the expected  growth  rate  of consumption 
c =  the actual growth rate of consumption. 
The frustration hypothesis, then, holds that the money wage rate adjusts a 
fraction, 6, of the difference between actual and expected growth in con- 
sumption: 
g9)  A(A In wt)  = 6 (c_-c-) 
Lagging (9) one period, multiplying by y, and subtracting yields 
(10)  A (A ln w)  =  -67zc,  +  a?  ln w,_,. 
The a priori signs on both coefficients  (3 and oy)  are positive. 
The summary results for the two specifications are shown in Table 10. 
Neither seems to have much explanatory power. In the frustration Phillips 
curve, only two of the estimated coefficients on the consumption variable 
are significantly different from zero (for the United States and West Ger- 
many), but they both have the wrong sign. The coefficient on the United 
Kingdom (the theory's intellectual domicile) is quite plausible, but it is very 
poorly determined. 
The pure frustration hypothesis fares very poorly. The adaptive term 
(-y) consistently has the wrong sign, as does the composite coefficient  (-be). 
Although the implied coefficients for 3 are plausible, none of the estimates 
tor it is significant. 
Given the miserable overall performance of the frustration hypothesis, 
there seems little point in examining the whole batch of  errors for the 
period of the wage explosion. Table  11 thus deals only with the United 
Kingdom. The frustration hypothesis, even there, fares no better than its 
competitors in explaining the wage explosion. -  -  }  -S  Cl  00  <  2 
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Table 11. Residuals for Regressions for Frustration  Wage Theories, 
United Kingdom,  1968-71 
Fruistraction  P/illips  Puire  fruistratio 
Year  cuirve  hiypothesisa 
1968  0.3  0.9 
1969  -2.0  1.8 
1970  3.4  6.4 
1971  1.0  5.9 
Average  0.7  3.7 
Source: See Table 10. 
a.  Assumes no error in levels for 1966. 
Externally  Constrained  Wage  Settlements 
A final general theory of the movement of money wage rates considers 
the compatibility of wage movements with payments balance. This theory 
starts with the proposition that in a closed economy a general inflation of 
goods and factor prices has practically no real effects. Therefore the only 
forces that constrain the absolute price level in a country are those relating 
to foreign trade, in particular  export and import prices. Obviously, political, 
social, or ideological constraints on inflation may also force policy makers 
to keep inflation within certain bounds. 
In the polar case of an extremely small open economy with a large frac- 
tion of GNP  traded or tradable, under fixed exchange rates, the foreign 
constraint on prices will be practically completely effective. There are only 
two exceptions: when the economy is virtually closed (as in the case of the 
United States), and when exchange rates are effectively flexible. 
In the  postwar monetary system, a  prime macroeconomic target has 
been defense of exchange rates at their par value. As long as countries were 
forced to regard  exchange rate changes as rare and undesirable  events, only 
three policies were available for accomplishing balance-of-payments ad- 
justment: regulating imports by aggregate demand, affecting capital move- 
ments by monetary policy, and holding the domestic price level in line with 
world prices.26  Of these, only the last can be regarded  as a reasonable long- 
run strategy for balance-of-payments equilibrium and as a substitute for 
exchange rate adjustments under the Bretton Woods system. 
26. This discussion neglects the differenitial  movement of export prices and other 
domestic prices. 452  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity  2:1972 
What then would  be the  wage settlenment  constrained by balance-of- 
payments equilibrium?  Under a regime of fixed exchange rates and full em- 
ployment, equilibrium at a given point of time (on, say, basic balance) will 
be consistent with a price level of p*(t). If prices are a markup (m) on unit 
labor costs, 
(1  1)  p(t)  =  (I  +  m) w(t)Ae7bt 
where 
p,(t)  =  export prices 
w(t) =  wage rates 
Ae-bt  =  average labor productivity at time t 
b =  rate of productivity growth in export industries. 
Equilibrium in the balance of payments implies the following equilibrium 
wage rate: 
(12)  w*(t) = p*(t) (I +  ;n)-' A-lebt. 
Finally, to breathe life into the hypothesis, the equilibrium price level must 
be defined, in this case as a price level that keeps the terms of trade con- 
stant: 
(13)  P*(t) =  Bp,(t), 
where p,(t) is import prices. Thus the final hypothesis is: 
(14)  w*(t) = p1(t)(l  +  mn)-1  AlBebt, 
or, in first differences of the logarithms, 
(15)  AIln  w*(t) =  mo +  nA lnp,(t),  MO  < O,ml  > 0. 
An externally constrained wage rate is thus one that moves with import 
prices  plus the rate of productivity growth in the export industry. 
When and where this formulation might be a plausible theory of wage 
determination  depends, first and crucially, on whether a fixed exchange rate 
system or a monetary union exists.27 It is clearly most sensible in a highly 
open economy where world (and therefore local) prices are effectively exog- 
enous and firms have strong incentives to keep wages at their equilibrium 
level.  Moreover,  where capital  is  mobile,  unions  may  feel  sufficiently 
threatened to accept the equilibrium rate. If unions do not accept the rate, 
there will be a squeeze on profits, capital movement, and unemployment in 
27. We return  to this point below. William D. Nordliaus  453 
the offending industry. Especially if there is differential wage movement 
among industries, low-inflation industries probably will prosper. 
Thus in very open economies,  and in exposed industries in less open 
economies, pressures  of the external market  are likely to constrain wages to 
follow the equilibrium rate. The important question is, then, the extent to 
which the exposed industries will act as a damper or a stimulus to sheltered 
industries. A Scandinavian model suggests that in periods of  full employ- 
ment, movements in the exposed sector quickly stimulate similar tendencies 
in the sheltered sector due to "competition for labor in a full employment 
economy and the 'Solidarity  Wage Policy' " of occupational rate equality.28 
The question, of course, is how big the exposed sector must be relative to 
the sheltered sector to nmake  it the wage leader. While the exposed sector is 
quite likely to dominate through this economic mechanism in Sweden and 
Norway, the proposition is less certain in Germany and France and posi- 
tively implausible in the United States. 
Aside from the pure labor market effect of externally constrained wage 
rates, the political component of this theory has become increasingly impor- 
tant during the 1960s. The political counterpart of the theory holds that 
governments  have aimed increasingly  at full employment, economic growth, 
and external payments equilibrium  as prime objectives. As noted above, the 
only reasonable manner in which external balance can be maintained is 
through assuring "price stability," which has come to mean prices that rise 
no faster than at the world rate. Faced with a crisis in external payments, 
governments  generally  turn to a combination of measures  restricting  capital 
flows and internal  demand, and to wage and price controls (euphemistically 
called "incomes policies"). To the extent that the economic mechanism fails 
(for example, when the exposed sector fails to restrain  the sheltered sector), 
governments impose wage and price controls as a substitute. 
Although examples are legion, the two most obvious came in the United 
Kingdom in 1966  and the Utnited  States in 1971  . When the United Kingdom 
was faced with a very serious run on sterling and a deteriorating external 
position, the Labor government responded by instituting severe measures 
to restrain demand accompanied by a wage and price freeze, a policy that 
was effective, if only temporarily. Similarly, the new economic policy under 
28. Gbsta Edgren, Karl-Olof Faxen, and Clas-Erik  Odhner,  "Wages, Growth and 
the Distribution  of Income,"  Swe(dish  Jouirnlacl  of Ecototonies,  Vol. 71 (September  1969), 
p. 142. See also Odd Aukrust and others, Itnstillitig  fra UtredniinigsuitvalgetJbr  inntitektsopp- 
gjrenze  (Oslo: 1966)  (referred  to as the Aukrust  Report). 454  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
Table 12.  Prediction Errors for Export-constraint  Wage Equation, 
Seven Countries, 
Standard  Durbint- 
Coefficienit  error of  Wcatsoni 
Counitry  n1  I  estimate  statistic 
Canada  -0.022  0.0220  0.11 
(0.464) 
France  0.106  0.0223  1.26 
(0.212) 
West Germany  0.236  0.0273  0.98 
(0.452) 
Japan  1.039  0.0222  1.07 
(0.233) 
Sweden  0.674  0.0184  2.70 
(0.251) 
United Kingdom  0.622  0.0209  1.34 
(0.188) 
United  States  0.384  0.0098  1.22 
(0.117) 
Source: See the text for an explanation of the equation, and the appendix for sources of the basic data, 
which are annual obser-vations  covering the  1955-71 period. The numbers in paretitheses are staindard 
errors. 
a.  Equation (16): A In wt  =  mo + mi(O.5 A In plg +  0.33 A In plt-I +  0.17 A In Plt2),  where w =  hourly 
earnings per worker in imianufacturing  industries atid p,  = import prices. 
the Nixon administration was, according to many informrants,  basically a 
response to the disastrous payments deficit of the second quarter of 1971. 
The  estimation  here used  current as  well  as  past  import  prices,  so 
the final equation is29 
(16)  Am  wI  = MO  + ml [O.5Alnp11  + 0.33lAInpi,-1  + 0.17lInpi1-2]. 
The results of this equation, which are quite encouraging, are shown in 
Table 12. For Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the import price 
term is large and significant, indicating that it could have a large effect on 
wages. 
The errors for the period of the wage explosion are shown in Table 13. 
They are small for West Germany, Sweden, the United States, Japan, and 
the United Kingdom, while they remain  pronounced for Canada and France. 
29. The original  version  of the paper  allowed a more flexible  lag. In order  to have a 
symmetric  treatment  with other theories,  it was felt that an imposed  lag would be fairer. 
No studies  allow determining  a priori  what the proper  lag is. Given lags both in recog- 
nizing the rise in import prices and in renegotiating  wage agreements,  a declining  lag 
over three  years is reasoniable. William D. Nordhlaus  455 
Table 13.  Prediction Errors  for Regressions  for Export-constraint  Wage 
Equation, Seven Countries, 1968-71 
Percent  per year 
Colititry  1968  1969  1970  1971  Average 
Canada  2.0  2.7  2.5  3.4  2.7 
France  4.0  2.2  1.6  2.5  2.6 
West Germany  -4.1  0.7  3.9  2.7  0.8 
Japan  3.0  2.9  0.9  0.5  1.8 
Sweden  -0.5  -0.  1  2.6  -1.7  0.1 
United Kingdom  -0.9  -2.1  3.7  2.7  0.9 
United States  1.6  1.3  -0.7  0.7  0.7 
Average  0.7  1.1  2.1  1.5  1.4 
Source: See Table 12. 
What  About  Incomes  Policies? 
So far this paper has had little to say about the recent social innovation 
called incomes policies. This is not because we doubt that incomes policies 
(in some forms, places, and times) can affect the movement of money wages, 
but  because, to  record the  conclusion  from  the  study by  Ulman  and 
Flanagan, 
incomes  policy,  to generalize  from  the experience  of the [seven]  countries  studied 
in this account,  has not been very  successful.... The accumulation  of experience 
in the countries  studied  . . . suggests  that in none  of the variations  so far  turned  up 
has incomes  policy succeeded  in its fundamental  objective,  as stated, of making 
full employment  consistent  with a reasonable  degree  of price  stability.30 
The irony in this observation is that incomes policy, although not invented 
in the late 1960s, came to be employed almost universally by western gov- 
ernments at about the time of the wage explosion.3' 
In any case, the imposition of incomes policies at different  times is prob- 
ably not  important for the main subject under consideration here-the 
wage explosion. There are only two ways in which incomes policies could 
have caused the wage explosion: (a) if they were extensively and effectively 
used up to 1967 and then suddenly turned o/.7 or (b) if they were suddenly 
turned on about 1968, but acted perversely on wage inflation. Both these 
30. Lloyd Ulman and Robert J.  Flanagan, Walge Restrainit. A  Sitdly  of  Iticornes 
Policies  in Westerni  Elurope (Berkeley:  University  of California  Press, 1971), p. 216. 
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positions have been taken by some economists in isolated instances; but 
they are clearly not accurate for the general picture. 
Overall Evaluation 
This examination of the five general theories of wages permits a tentative 
evaluation of their performance. With standard errors as the criterion of 
performance, the theories are ranked in Table 14, and the best theory for 
each country is indicated by bold-face type. These rankings show how well 
the theories explain wage movements in a given country for the overall 
period of fit, 1955-71. Table 15 shows the summary results for the period of 
the wage explosion, 1968-71. Here, too, bold-face type is used to denote the 
best theory. 
Table 14. Rankings of Selected Wage Theories for Seven Countriesa 
MoIoetarist  Phillips cuirve  Frutstrctioii 
Export- 
Coni-  Unicon-  Expec-  Phillips  CO/I- 
Coul,try  strainled  strcihied  NaYive  t(ltiolis  Putre  clurve  s/rciint 
Canada  4h  31)  2')  1  C  C  e 
France  2h  c  c  c  c  c  I 
West Germany  31)  C  C  C  C  2 
Japan  4"  C  31)  21)  c  1  I 
Sweden  4h  c  2  3  c  c  1 
United Kingdom  2')  C  c  C  C  C  1 
United States  5b)  2  3b  1  C  4b 
Soutces: See sources and notes for Tables 2, 5, 7, 10, and 12. 
a.  The ranking shows I for lowest standard error of estimate, 7 for highest. For couLntries  where at least 
one theory was acceptable, bold-face type inidicates  the best. 
b. Significatntly  worse than the best equation at the 10 percent level. 
c.  At least one incorrect sign for a crucial coefficient. 
From the general results, it appears that the monetarist  viewpoint should 
be ruled out as a serious theory of wage inflation. For no country does 
either version of this theory perform better than competing theories. The 
constrained monetarist version performs especially badly, finishing at or 
near the end in every race, even when some particularly  slow nags are en- 
tered. The widespread impression that excessive monetary expansion was 
the chief causal factor in recent inflations is clearly not founded on empirical 
association.32 
32. It must be reiterated  that in many of the other theories  monetary  policy plays a 
partieal role in determining  inflation. Thus in the Phillips curve theories, monetary Willicam  D. Norcdlhaus  457 
Table 15. Comparison  of Prediction Errors for Selected Wage Theory 
Regressions,  Seven Countries,  Wage Explosion Period, 1968-71 
Mean  prediction  errors,  percent  per yeara 
Monietarist  Plhillips  cuarve  Frustration 
-  Export- 
Conl-  Unlco;i-  Expec-  Phillips  conl- 
Country  strainceied  strinled  NaiYve  tcationis  Puire  cuirve  straint 
Canada  1.6  2.6  2.8  0.2a  )  t)  b9 
France  2.4  b  b  t,  t,  1,  2.6 
West  Germany  0.7  b  0.7  t)  h  b  0.8 
Japan  9.3  t,  4.7  3.2  t,  l'  1.8a 
Sweden  -1  . 0  b  1.4  1.4  h)  0.  la 
United 
Kingdom  -2.3  h  h  t)  b  h  O.9a 
United States  2.0  2.8  0.9  O.la  b)  b  0.7 
Sources: See sources and notes for Tables 2, 5, 7, 10, and 12. 
a.  For countries vwhere  at least one theory seems acceptable, the best is indicated by bold-face type. 
b.  At least one incorrect sign for a crucial coefficient. 
It is equally apparent thatfrustration theories of the wage movement do 
not perform  sufficiently  well to be taken seriously. As Table 10  demonstrates, 
the signs are wrong in almost all regressions. The frustration Phillips curve 
does better than any other single explanation for the United Kingdom only 
because  the unemployment term has the wrong sign. The only other country 
for which the frustration theory does well is Japan. 
Eliminating the monetarist and frustration theories leaves two general 
classes of  explanations, the Phillips curve explanations and the export- 
constraint  theories. 
The Phillips cturve  approach provides an adequate empirical explanation 
for wage movements in the United States and Canada. This empirical result 
is supported by the theoretical considerations (outlined above) implying 
that Phillips curve approaches should do rather better in these two coun- 
tries than in the others. According to Table 15, the expectations Phillips 
curve approach gives nearly unbiased predictions during the period of the 
wage explosion in both these countries. That the wage explosion in the 
policy,  alotig wit/  fiscal policy and other demand  determinants,  helps determine  aggre- 
gate demand. Inflation  is then determined  as the pressure  of demand works its way 
through  the system. This partial  association of monetary  policy with inflation  should 
not be confused  with the total association of the monetarist  viewpoint.  The refutation 
of the monetarist  proposition  that "only money  matters"  does not imply  the proposition 
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United  States  and  Canada  was  due  to the effects  of tight  labor  markets  and 
the  lagged  effect  of the  consequent  inflation  is, then,  the  tentatively  accepted 
view. 
On the other  hand,  the Phillips  curve  does not appear  to be an adequate 
explanation  of wage movements  in the other,  smaller,  countries.  With  the 
exception  of Sweden,  the Phillips  curve  approach  is distinctly  inferior,  and 
in most  cases  has incorrect  signs  (it gives  an upward  sloping  Phillips  curve 
in the United  Kingdom!).  Clearly,  other  important  forces  were  at work  in 
these  countries. 
The export-constraint  theory  of wage  movements  appears  to be the most 
adequate  explanation  for Japan, Sweden,  and the United Kingdom. In 
these  three  countries,  it is statistically  the most satisfactory.  Furthermore, 
it explains  the period  of the wage  explosion  quite  well  for both Sweden  and 
the United Kingdom,  and better  than other  theories  for Japan  (see Table 
15). 
In summary,  the export-constraint  theory  appears  to do quite well for 
open  economies  in which  wages  are  plausibly  linked  to foreign  trade.  It was 
not expected  in any case to perform  well for either  the United States or 
Canada,  but the cases of Germany,  and especially  France,  remain  some- 
what puzzling.  In Germany,  the period  under  study probably  should be 
broken  at 1960. Until that year, West Germany  had considerable  unem- 
ployment  due to the postwar  reconstruction  and labor  immigration.  After 
1960,  with  the  construction  of the Berlin  wall  and  slowdown  of immigration 
from  Southern  Europe,  unemployment  declined  to slightly  less than l per- 
cent. Only after 1960  was the labor market  in the kind of equilibrium  in 
which  explanations  like the Phillips  curve  or the export-constraint  theory 
could be reasonably  satisfactory.33 
France's  inflation,  like its history,  is sui generis.  French history  takes 
its landmark  dates from revolutions.  Thus the wage explosion must be 
dated from les eve'nements  de mai-juin 1968. For  the  preceding decade, 
French  workers  had become  accustomed  to wage increases  of between  6 
and 8 percent.  Suddenly,  from 1968 on, wage settlements  have been be- 
tween 10 and 12 percent.  No obvious economic  factor  explains  the 1968 
mini-revolution  and  its inflationary  aftermath:  Unemployment  was slightly 
33. A batch of regressions  was run for Germany using the sample period 1961-71. 
For this period, nafve Phillips curves performed  better than any other theory, with a 
standard  error  of estimate  25 percent  lower than that for 1956-71. This implies a sig- 
nificant  break  in structure  between  the two periods. William D. Nordhaus  459 
higher  after 1967;  and, up to the devaluation  of 1969,  import  prices  were 
stable  and  consumer  prices  chugged  along  with  increases  of less  than  3 per- 
cent  annually. 
Implications 
The results  are messy, but there does emerge  a fairly  coherent  picture 
of the wage explosion  in the late 1960s.  The wage inflation  in the United 
States  and Canada  can be attributed  to the tightness  of the labor  markets. 
Outside  of North  America  the rise  in wages  can  be more  tenably  ascribed  to 
the permissive  economic  climate  generated  by a rise  in import  prices. 
What then is the initiating  force in the worldwide  inflation?  Figure 2 
tells  the story.  It shows  the simple  averages  of the rate  of wage  inflation  for 
North America  (the United States and Canada)  and for the other five 
countries  (France,  Germany,  Japan,  Sweden,  and the United Kingdom). 
After  the period  of tranquility  (1958  to 1964)  the rate  of wage inflation  in 
the North  American  countries  began  to rise.  It became  especially  steep  as a 
result  of the strains  imposed  by the Vietnam  war  boom and the associated 
mismanagement  of aggregate  demand  starting  in 1966.34 
The response  in the other  countries  did not, evidently,  come gradually. 
Rather,  there were sharp  jumps in 1968, 1969, and 1970. Although  the 
suddenness  of the response  in the five  countries  is slightly  surprising,35  the 
precedence  of the inflation  in North America  is unmistakable.  Together 
with the econometric  evidence  presented  above, the evidence  on the lags 
suggests  quite  strongly  that  the rise  in the general  level of world  prices  was 
indeed  the most  significant  causal  factor  of the wage  explosion  in countries 
outside  of North America. 
How does the United States exert such a powerful  influence  on prices 
abroad?  Paradoxically,  the answer  is because  the United  States  is the only 
country  that  does  not (or  can  afford  not to) care  seriously  about  the  effect  of 
its price  level on its external  position.  With the possible  exception  of the 
34. For an insider's  view of "the inflation  goof," see Arthur M. Okun, The  Political 
Econiomy of Prosperity  (Brookings  Institution,  1970),  Chap. 3. 
35. The dip in 1967 is slightly misleading.  A glance at Table I shows that it is due 
almost entirely  to dips in two countries-the  United Kingdom  and Germany-caused 
in the first case by the July 1966 measures  in the United Kingdom, which imposed a 
freeze  on wages and prices,  and, in the second, by the sharp recession  in Germany. I- 
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early 1960s, U.S. domestic policy has never been seriously constrained by 
anxieties about the effects of expansion on the balance of payments. Com- 
pare this insouciance with the  primitive "stop-go" management in  the 
United Kingdom described by Samuel Brittan: 
In the 1950s  and early 1960s  the Treasury  behaved  like a simple  Pavlovian  dog 
responding  to two main  stimuli:  one is "a run on the reserves,"  and the other is 
"500,000  unemployed."36 
If, under a regime of fixed exchange rates, all other countries follow a 
course of domestic demand management with an eye to maintaining bal- 
ance-of-payments equilibrium through price restraint, the United States 
will determine the world inflation rate. This is, formally, the solution to 
the well-known "n-country problem" in  international payments adjust- 
ment. If the United States suddenly became active instead of passive with 
respect to its payments balance (some evidence of this appeared under the 
new economic policy initiated in August 1971), the payments targets might 
be inconsistent; in this case other countries might help determine the world 
inflation rate. As long as the United States is passive in payments policy, it 
can have the last word in inflation policy. 
All this depends crucially on the fact that other countries make a totem 
of stable exchange rates. With increasing frequency in the last few years, 
countries have used exchange rates rather  than internal wages and prices as 
the medium of external adjustment. How would the prospects for world in- 
flation change if the trend toward freely floating rates were fully realized? 
Bankers and hauts  financiers hold to the credo that freely floating exchange 
rates would be "inflationary."37  If the evidence outlined here is correct, the 
inflationary  consequences of floating exchange ratesfor countries  other than 
the United States are indeed serious. If the only firm peg on which to hang 
domestic prices is the external price level, its removal might well loosen 
restraints and produce serious inflations in these countries. No  one in the 
dialogue about floating rates has suggested a substitute for this restraint  on 
inflation. 
36.  The Treaisutry  undler  tile Tories, 1951-1964  (Penguin,  1964), p. 288. 
37. Even the strongest  proponent  of floating  exchange  rates, Milton Friedman,  ad- 
mits this objection may have merit "for countries .  . . that hlave  been susceptible  to 
highly inflationary  policies, that have been willing to submit to the discipline of the 
balance  of payments,  and for which foreign  trade is a substantial  part of total trade." 
Milton Friedman,  "First Lecture," in Milton Friedman and Robert V. Roosa, Thle 
Balance of Payments: Free verslus  Fixed Ex./change  Rates (American  Enterprise Inistitute 
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A PPEN DIX 
Symbols  and Sources  of Data 
Used in Regressions 
THIS APPENDIX  PROVIDES  a list of the variables used in this paper, together 
with their sources, and a key to  the abbreviations used to  identify the 
sources. 
Symbols and Sources 
Symbol  Name of variable  and explanatory notes  Source 
C  Consumption  expenditures  at  constant  ERP, UN/SY, 
market prices; for the most part, these  UN/NAS, 
use standard U.N.  techniques. Values  OECD/ME1 
for  1971 are preliminary for  Sweden, 
Germany, and France. 
h  Average weekly (monthly for Japan) hours  ERP, UN/SY, 
per worker  OECD/HS, 
OECD/MEI, 
UK/G 
I, pi  Indices of unit volume and unit value of  ERP, 
imports, respectively; 1963 =  100  OECD/HS, 
OECD/MEI 
M  Money  supply,  generally defined as  the  ERP, UN/SY, 
sum of demand deposits and currency  OECD/HS, 
in circulation, that is, M1; the data are  OECD/MEI 
year-end values, so  M,_1 refers to  the 
money supply lagged six months. 
p  Consumer  price  index  (base-weighted  ERP, UN/SY, 
Laspeyres  indices,  usually  based  on  OECD/HS, 
1963 weights)  OECD/MEI, 
UK/G William D. Nordhlaus  463 
Symbol  Name of variable  and explanatory  notes  Source 




w  Hourly earnings per worker in manufac-  ERP, UN/SY, 
turing  industries.  Wage  rates  for  all  OECD/HS, 
countries but Japan cover only produc-  OECD/MEI, 
tion workers; for France, Japan, Ger-  UK/G 
many, and the United Kingdom social 
insurance contributions  or  family  al- 
lowances or both are included. 
X  Gross national (or domestic) product at  ERP, UN/SY, 
constant market prices  UN/NAS, 
OECD/MEI 
Ire  Lagged historical  inflation  rate,  or  ex-  ... 
pected rate of  inflation. This  series is 
generated from lagged actual inflation 
(A ln  pt)  according to  a  geometric lag 
with a weight of adaptation of price ex- 
pectations of 0.8 truncated after seven 
years: 
Year lag  Weight 
1  0.253 
2  0.202 
3  0.162 
4  0.130 
5  0.103 
6  0.083 
7  0.067 
Mean lag  3.15 years 
Key to Sources 
ERP  Economic Report of the President Together with the An- 
nual  Report  of  the  Council of  Economic Advisers, 
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UN/SY  United Nations,  Statistical Yearbook,  various issues 
UN/NAS  United Nations,  Yearbook of National Accounts Statis- 
tics, various issues. 
OECD/HS  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop- 
ment, Main Economic Indicators. Historical Statistics, 
1959-1969 (Paris: OECD,  1970), and earlier volumes. 
OECD/LFS  Labour  Force Statistics, various issues. 
OECD/MEI  Main Economic Itidicators,  various issues. 
UK/G  Department  of  Employment  Gazette  (London:  Hei 
Majesty's Stationery Office), various issues. 
Discussion 
THERE  WAS  AN EXTENDED  DISCUSSION  of how far one should  go on the 
basis of Nordhaus' rather simple equations in drawing conclusions either 
about  alternative explanations of  inflation or  about  differences among 
countries. Saul Hymans pointed out that specialists from each country 
involved would have far more sophisticated models of their own economies 
than those used by Nordhaus in testing any of the theories he examines. 
Lawrence Klein agreed there was a need to explain the current inflation in 
some unifying way for all the countries involved. But he argued that to do 
this, one had to take a hard look at every country individually in order to 
incorporate crucial institutional differences into the wage equations for 
each before attempting to test any particular theory. In order to estimate 
common parameters  well among countries, it is essential to take account of 
specific variables or structural characteristics in individual countries. He 
and several other participants cited institutional factors specific to several 
countries that they regarded  as essential to understanding  the wage behavior 
in each. 
Robert Solow countered that, while such detailed modeling might be 
essential for many purposes, he took Nordhaus' paper to address  a question William D. Nordhaus  465 
for which his more summary equations could be useful: Is there some ele- 
mentary, common explanation for the sharp acceleration in inflation that 
occurred in every country for the last several years? Nordhaus concurred 
with Solow's interpretation and emphasized that he was not attempting to 
construct the best equation for predicting wage movements in each coun- 
try. He added that some elaborate predicting equations, such as the OECD 
equation for German wages, probably had little value for detecting what 
really governed wage movements since they were constructed after so much 
experimentation with the data in order to get the best fit to the historical 
record. 
Nordhaus' rejection of the monetarist wage model generated comments 
from many panel participants. R. J. Gordon felt that the analysis should 
center on the "academic" statements of Friedman and other monetarists 
and not on Friedman's "polemic" statements. Gordon found Friedman's 
academic wage model to be very similar to the expectations Phillips curve 
equations tested in the paper. William Fellner suggested that the essential 
core of  the monetarist argument was that a change in the fiscal deficit 
without a change in the money supply has no effect on income because an 
increase in the deficit "crowds out" an equivalent amount of private expen- 
ditures. If this is the essential element in the monetarist theory, Fellner 
thought it impossible to test its significance  without further development of 
the Nordhaus framework. 
Fellner discussed the implications for the behavior of  inflation under 
flexible exchange rates of  Nordhaus' results supporting the export-con- 
straint hypothesis. He noted that it is not clear that the introduction of 
flexible exchange rates would  free economic  policy  makers from their 
politically perceived obligation to restrain inflation. He contended that it 
made little difference whether the currency of a country was declining in 
value under flexible rates or it was on its way to losing all its reserves under 
fixed rates; in either case, policy makers might or might not assume their 
anti-inflationary obligations since they might or might not prevent a con- 
tinuous decline of their flexible rates and might or might not prevent  abrupt 
devaluations of their so-called fixed rates. Lawrence Krause noted that the 
effect of  flexible exchange rates on  the domestic economy depends very 
much on whether  deflation or inflation is being transmitted. If it is inflation, 
flexible exchange rates would make it easier to minimize the domestic infla- 
tion effects since exchange rate adjustments  would then offset the impact of 
the external inflation by keeping import prices down. 